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State Intervention and Private Enterprise:
Japan, the U.S., and China
October 2, 2013 | Columbia University

This conference addressed the topic of state intervention in private enterprise, comparing recent and historical trends in the United
States, China, and Japan. Speakers and discussants addressed a broad range of topics relevant to the subject of intervention, from
state-owned enterprises, to government buyouts of distressed firms, to regulation surrounding foreign direct investment. This event
was co-hosted by the Center for Japanese Legal Studies (CJLS) at Columbia Law School, the Center on Japanese Economy and
Business (CJEB) at Columbia Business School, and the Japan Economic Foundation ( JEF).

Panel I: United States
In the first panel, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones
Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, gave a presentation on state intervention in
the U.S., followed by responses and further discussion
with Christopher J. Mayer, Paul Milstein Professor of Real
Estate at Columbia Business School, and Roger Kubarych,
vice chairman of Craig Drill Capital and former national
intelligence manager at the National Intelligence Council.
Merit E. Janow, dean and professor of professional practice
in international economic law & international affairs at
the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA),
Columbia University, moderated the panel.
Dean Janow opened the panel discussion by sharing a
memory from the 1980s, when many in the United States
were debating Japanese interventionist policies in the
industrial sector, including direct subsidies, bailouts, and

(Left to right) Roger Kubarych, Christopher J. Mayer,
Gary Clyde Huf bauer, Merit E. Janow

heavy import tariffs. Then the U.S. government made
several large-scale interventions, albeit generally followed
by a rapid government exit, in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis. With this in mind, she asked the panelists
what they believe to be the nature and effectiveness of U.S.
intervention in private enterprise.
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Dr. Hufbauer concluded by outlining three phases of robust
U.S. interventionism: agricultural subsidies beginning in
the Great Depression; support for the housing industry
after the Great Depression; and the recent bailouts of large
failing firms.The continuation of these policies is evidence
that the United States is an interventionist state, despite
myths to the contrary.
Professor Mayer, an expert on the housing and financial
service credit markets, agreed with Dr. Hufbauer’s remarks
that the housing industry is a favored industry. The fact
that implicit rent is non-taxable is one clear piece of
evidence for this assertion. Professor Mayer added to this
idea, explaining that housing is the most significantly
subsidized sector worldwide because the largest financial
return to owner-occupied housing is that “you get to live
in the home.” He stated that, as far as he knows, virtually
no country has a wealth tax specific to housing.

Hugh Patrick, Robert D. Calkins Professor of International Business
Emeritus and director of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business

Dr. Hufbauer responded by stating that every country has its
national myths. In the case of the United States, the myth is
that the government does not intervene in private enterprise.
He asserted that, on the contrary, the United States has at
least three distinct, regular forms of industrial intervention
policy. The first is the tax code, which he contended is an
illustration of interventionism favoring small enterprises. He
asserted that this type of intervention strongly disfavors large
firms, who pay the highest statutory tax rates. The second
example of U.S. intervention is the provision of explicit and
implicit loan guarantees; while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were not explicitly guaranteed before the Great Recession
(c. 2008), they were implicitly supported, and since the Great
Recession have been explicitly guaranteed. In addition, since
the Great Depression (c. 1930), U.S. farmers have benefitted
from favorable-rate and easy-term agricultural loans. In
general, the U.S. Congress favors loan guarantees for select
frontier industries, and for the last decade, has strongly favored
renewable energy. The third example Dr. Hufbauer cited
was price and volume support for favored industries. While
agricultural commodities are perhaps the most obvious
example, he also addressed renewable energy and health
policy. For example, the U.S. government guarantees prices
for green energy, and Obamacare requires the compulsory
purchase of insurance by individuals.

With regard to the 2008 economic crisis, Professor Mayer
differentiated Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae from other
“bailed out” companies, such as American International
Group (AIG) and General Motors (GM). Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae, he explained, were purchased by the
U.S. government without an exit plan. However, the
government did not purchase every share of the two entities
and left many private stakes outstanding, which have since
been acquired by private equity investors. Professor Mayer
contended that this lack of exit planning confuses investors
and taxpayers alike. Investors need more information to
make good decisions, and taxpayers need to maintain
realistic expectations of their government.
Professor Mayer concluded by referencing Dr. Hufbauer’s
comments on the corporate tax code, arguing that the
discussion is about “tradeable” versus “non-tradeable”
goods. He explained that tradeable goods include those
provided by large, economy-dependent firms, and nontradeable goods include real estate. When tradeable goods
are taxed, they move to other markets.When non-tradeable
goods are taxed, they stay in their current markets.Thus, he
argued that tradeable goods should have a lower tax rate.
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States is not unique in that every country has foreign direct
investment (FDI) restrictions; many of these regulations are
defense-related, but they also apply to aircraft and airlines,
infrastructure, and broadcasting.
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Dr. Hufbauer pointed out that the case of General Motors
was a successful example of U.S. government intervention.
The government effectively prioritized stakeholders’
interests while maintaining investor confidence.
Dean Janow posed additional questions: how should the
rest of the world react to U.S. intervention? Is it a violation
of the subsidies code or was government intervention
absolutely necessary during such a crisis? Should states be
allowed to intervene during crises?

Mr. Kubarych explained that state intervention in this
realm is coordinated by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This interagency committee assesses the national security risk of
FDI transactions. About 100 foreign acquisitions of U.S.
firms are brought to CFIUS yearly. CFIUS operates on
tight deadlines so as to not hold up transactions. For
the transactions that raise national security issues, the
Committee can ask for modifications or discourage the
transaction in its entirety. Mr. Kubarych asserted that the
vast majority of the cases are amicable and CFIUS does
not represent a significant barrier to FDI.

In response, Dr. Hufbauer stated that, should other countries
wish to continue as democratic, middle-class countries, they
should follow the example of the United States and prevent
the financial sector collapsing during a crisis. Complete
collapse ensures fire sale conditions, which are terrible for
middle class families. He cited Greece as an example.
Mr. Kubarych asserted that high-level policy forums
such as the G-20 should facilitate extended dialogues on
excesses, and countries should be prepared to compensate
for their own misdeeds in intervention when their actions
create negative externalities for the global economy.
Mr. Kubarych maintained that this is the reason he is
supportive of multilateral trade pacts such as the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP); these are venues in which
countries can achieve mutually beneficial results.

Dean Janow then opened up the discussion by asking
the group if they believe that cases of recent U.S.
intervention have been successful, and if so, why. The
first response came from Dr. Hufbauer, who asserted
that the success of government intervention in Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae is yet to be seen. Professor Mayer
agreed with Dr. Hufbauer, but went further to say that
government intervention in this case should be a model
of “what not to do.” Professor Mayer asserted that part
of the reason the housing market has not fully recovered
is that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have acted neither
in the market’s interest nor in their own financial
interest. Mr. Kubarych expressed a slightly different view,
recalling the history of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. He
contended that they did indeed misbehave, but not in
the way economists thought they would. He also argued
that it was the private sector that truly got the housing
market into trouble by creating collateralized mortgage
obligations based on subprime mortgages.

Kazuhiko Toyama
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Professor Huang presented his summary of the three
key characteristics of state capitalism: 1) intervention
in the economy is performed in a one-party system; 2)
the government acts as a substitute for the private sector;
and 3) government intervention into private enterprise is
not done for social purposes, but instead performed for
economic, even political-economic, purposes. Professor
Huang criticized this model, arguing that economic
performance is sacrificed in state capitalism.

Yasheng Huang, international program professor in
Chinese economy and business and professor of global
economics and management at MIT Sloan School of
Management, gave a presentation on state intervention
in China, and Long Ke, senior fellow at the Economic
Research Center of Fujitsu Research Institute served as
discussant. Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt, Fuyo Professor
of Japanese Law and director of the Center for Japanese
Legal Studies, moderated the panel.

By dissecting China’s model and current status, Professor
Huang challenged the assertion that China is the “new
magic for economic development.” He recalled the
importance of maintaining a historical perspective: state
capitalism may spur the economy to grow quickly, but
it compresses and causes a long lag in growth. Professor
Huang drew on examples of Brazil in the 1960s and the
Soviet Union to support his analysis.

Professor Huang refuted any argument claiming equivalence
between the United States bank bailout and the type of
intervention the Chinese have long been engaged in. He
pointed out three critical dimensions against which to
assess the way each country has handled state intervention.
First is the rationale for state intervention, which has
two parts: 1) response to a market failure; and 2) acting
as substitute for the private sector. In the case of China,
the state intervenes as a private sector substitute. The
second dimension is whether or not the state intervenes
with a social or an economic purpose. For example, he
explained that Obamacare is designed to deal both with
a market failure and to promote a social objective. The
third dimension is the institutional setting in which the
interventions are undertaken—in short, whether or not
the intervention is deliberated in a democratic setting will
determine the level of transparency.

Professor Huang addressed the argument that became
popular after the 2008 global recession that democracy is
“bad” for economic growth. He stressed the importance
of using relevant benchmarks when comparing economic
growth. If one compares India and China, for example,
then India’s growth looks quite small. However, if one
then compares India and Pakistan, one could conclude
that GDP grows faster within a democracy than under an
authoritarian regime.

(Left to right) Long Ke, Yasheng Huang, Curtis J. Milhaupt
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Comparing democracies to one-party systems, Professor
Huang stated that one-party systems either do extremely
well or extremely poorly. He argued that a country’s
political system is a reflection of how risk tolerant it is;
one-party systems have higher economic growth potential
but are much more volatile.
Professor Huang asserted that there are many challenges
facing the Chinese economy today, chiefly the unbalanced
nature of the country’s economic growth. While state
capitalism is good at producing GDP growth, it is not good
at increasing personal income. He explained that personal
income as a share of GDP started out in the early 1990s
in China at about 45-47%, which was already low among
countries in its income range. Currently, personal income to
GDP is around 35-37%, by far the lowest among any major
economy for which data are available. In addition, labor’s
share of GDP has come down significantly; consumption
share of GDP is destined to decline further as a result.

(Left to right) Long Ke, Yasheng Huang

Professor Milhaupt stated that while both Professor Huang
and Mr. Ke alluded to the propensity of the Xi Jinping
administration toward reform, he finds it unlikely that the
political system will be fundamentally overhauled any time
soon. He asked Professor Huang and Mr. Ke what kinds
of reform they believe are feasible, which specific reforms
are most important in the next few years, and whether it
is possible to gauge the seriousness of the government in
generating real reform.

Professor Huang concluded by noting that very few countries
have been able to graduate from the middle income trap after
World War II. The countries that were able to graduate in
the 1970s and 1980s had low income inequality. Therefore,
China’s high level of inequality will most likely prevent
it from graduating. However, he noted that the current
administration of Xi Jinping is more interested than previous
administrations in correcting income inequality.

Mr. Ke responded by contending that the current Chinese
administration is concerned about social stability, but also
about slowing economic growth, and as such, is finding it
hard politically to advocate for reform. Professor Huang
responded by explaining that, before 2008, Chinese private
entrepreneurs were largely supportive of the government.
Since then, there has been a shift in opinion, which has
only been exacerbated by arrests of those who speak up
against the government. By and large, members of the
private sector are disappointed with Xi Jinping’s leadership,
Professor Huang claimed. He concluded by stating that,
while capitalism may be associated with income inequality,
it is not the reason for Chinese inequality; state control is
the ultimate cause.

Mr. Ke expressed agreement with Professor Huang’s
analysis, asserting that due to the policies of the Hu Jintao
administration, the current Xi Jinping administration faces
many difficulties, such as how to approach government
reform, sustain economic development, and stabilize
growth. Mr. Ke agreed with Professor Huang, particularly
regarding the serious problem of income inequality, with
3% of the population owning 75% of the country’s assets.
Mr. Ke concluded by stating that China’s challenge is to
maintain its progress in economic development. In order
to succeed, the Xi Jinping administration must reform the
economic system and strengthen the rule of law to realize
that goal in the long term.
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Panel III: Japan
Kazuhiko Toyama, representative director and CEO of
Industrial Growth Platform, Inc., gave a presentation on
state intervention in Japan, followed by responses and further
discussion with Sota Kato, professor at the International
University of Japan and senior fellow at the Tokyo
Foundation, and Edward Lincoln, professorial lecturer at
George Washington University and adjunct professor of
economics at Columbia’s Department of Economics. The
panel was moderated by Alicia Ogawa, senior advisor at
CJEB and adjunct associate professor at SIPA.

(Left to right) E dward Lincoln, Sota Kato, Kazuhiko Toyama,
Alicia Ogawa

challenges. Specifically, when JAL ran into trouble, the
government provided so much assistance that it was unfair to
JAL’s competitors. Mr. Toyama argued that it was necessary
for the government to step in to protect the domestic
economy—allowing JAL to fail would have created a
domestic shock. However, since JAL did not go through
the typical control auction and the government allowed
JAL to re-list its shares, this hampered the market power of
All Nippon Airlines (ANA), JAL’s main competitor; if JAL
had been brought to auction, ANA would have had the
chance to buy in.

Professor Ogawa commenced the session by framing industrial
policy as either reactive or proactive. Proactive economic
policy is what Japan is famous for—from managing the
decline of industries that are overly mature to supporting new
industries that the government foresees to be winners, both
domestically and in export markets. However, this policy has
resulted in the government intervening to fill voids the private
sector is reluctant to fill.The private sector is thus disinclined
to take any risks, illustrated by its hesitancy to supply risk
capital, manage its own consolidation of excess capacity, and
pay wage increases.

Mr. Toyama concluded by saying that once a government
chooses to intervene in private enterprise, the government
itself becomes a market player and runs the risk of
distorting the market through government influence.
Intervention can be justified, but the government should
not manipulate the competition and should be careful
in implementation. In this sense, the IRCJ is viewed as a
successful venture in Japan. However, Mr. Toyama argued,
“the reality of intervention is that human beings don’t have
invisible hands.”

Mr. Toyama began by explaining that the majority of his
remarks were based on his experience as chief operating
officer of the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of
Japan (IRCJ) from 2003 until 2007. The IRCJ was a
government-owned fund that bought failing companies’
debt and equities, restructured the firms, and then sold
the companies back to the market through a control-share
auction. The IRCJ assessed more than 200 companies and
intervened in 41 during its time of operation (April 2003
– March 2007).

Professor Kato generally agreed with Mr. Toyama’s
comments, but said they brought up a key question: can the
guidelines on these public-private funds be implemented?
More specifically, can market incentives prevail despite
heavy Japanese government intervention? He also pointed
out that there is a high level of political involvement in
these funds, further restricting market forces.

Mr.Toyama classified two main challenges with his work at
the IRCJ: 1) determining the criteria for intervention; and
2) being conscious of the public interest. Both challenges
were complicated by political and media pressures, leading
to market distortion. Mr. Toyama used the bankruptcy
of Japan Air Lines (JAL) as an example to explain these
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Professor Kato illustrated this dynamic with an example
regarding these public-private funds and their administrator,
the Ministry of Economy and Industry (METI), an agency
which also creates and implements industrial policy.
Historically, METI was insulated from politics, even during
Japan’s high-growth era. It lacked the authority of the
Ministry of Finance and had little influence on the banking
sector.Without having financial tools, METI was only able
to act as a weak coordinator of the private sector during
the high-growth era. Because of this weakness, METI often
had to succumb to the market incentives of the private
sector. However, METI’s portfolio now includes publicprivate funds that provide long-awaited financial tools
for METI bureaucrats. METI is also more susceptible to
political influence; recently, PM Shinzo Abe convened a
Cabinet meeting regarding these funds, exemplifying the
politicization of industrial policy. In turn, METI’s influence
on the private sector is also enhanced.
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Professor Lincoln initiated his comments with a broad
observation: Japan resembles neither the United States
nor China with regard to state intervention in the private
market. Looking back to the 1970s and 1980s in Japan, there
was a deep mistrust of markets on the part of government
officials, academics, and the private sector.They did not trust
the market to allocate resources in the correct direction to
enable the economy to grow faster.Therefore, Japan initiated
an active industrial policy including state financing through
the Japan Development Bank, some state ownership (but
not to the extent of China-style SOEs), very specific tax
breaks, and subsidies to the agricultural sector.
Professor Lincoln stated that, since these industrial
policies of the 1980s were implemented, there has been a
reversal trend: some tax breaks have been removed, Japan
National Railways and NTT have been privatized, and
even agricultural subsidies have been somewhat relaxed.
Additionally, the Japanese market is more open to imports,
which in turn creates more domestic competition, and
makes it difficult to run an industrial policy “behind the
closed door of protectionism.”

Given the politicization of METI and these funds, Professor
Kato said he finds the political, bureaucratic, and economic
motivations of all different parties involved hard to
reconcile. He concluded that one of the key success factors
for public-private funds is to allow market incentives to
prevail. Therefore, it would be necessary to develop a longterm strategy for governing these funds, with careful design
of incentive mechanisms.

Professor Lincoln addressed Mr. Toyama’s argument that,
while there is a case to be made in favor of government
intervention and bailouts, the government must be very
careful about choosing when to act. Building upon this,
Professor Lincoln argued that perhaps the IRCJ was not
being careful enough when deciding which companies
to bail out; referring back to a list Mr. Toyama provided
detailing the 41 companies that the IRCJ rescued, he said
some of those businesses deserved to fail.
Professor Lincoln said he was disturbed by the addition
of many more Japanese public-private funds similar to
the IRCJ, calling them reminiscent of an old-fashioned
industrial policy rather than crisis-response mechanisms.
He was concerned that PM Shinzo Abe was trending
toward renewed government involvement in the economy,
and questioned if this move was political in nature. Professor
Lincoln expressed concern about Japanese government
intervention moving forward, saying that the ultimate

Sota Kato
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justification for intervention is market failure, which occurs
much less in modern times than it did in previous decades
such as the 1950s and 1960s. He contended that today,
Japan has a harder case to make for intervention.
Professor Ogawa asked the panelists if they believed that the
absence of risk and venture capital is a market failure, and
why the IRCJ and the similar private-public funds have not
jump-started the venture capital industry in Japan. Professor
Kato explained that he considered the funds to be the
transition step in the creation of a new, alternative privateled financial system that will someday include risk capital.
Professor Lincoln claimed that these funds will not fix the
problem of lack of risk capital, but this issue can instead be
resolved by providing incentives for Japanese companies to
be more accepting of foreign firms and capital, which, in
turn, would change the risk environment.

(Left to right) A licia Ogawa, Kazumasa Kusako, Hugh Patrick,
Curtis Milhaupt, Merit Janow

Mr. Ke said he did not know of an adequate solution to
address the issue of transparency within a one-party system.
Regarding the Japan-related question, Mr.Toyama said that
when the IRCJ came into being, some in the private sector
were against it, while others were supportive. He contended
that public-private funds can encourage private sector
venture capitalists to get more involved, as these publicprivate funds have been very successful. However, when
there is no economic crisis, the public-private funds do
less work, and therefore don’t provide examples of success
to private sector venture capitalists. As such, he encouraged
the government to come up with an adequate policy to
encourage venture capitalists in times of economic stability.

The three panel sessions were followed by a roundtable
discussion and audience Q&A.Two of the more interesting
questions came from Professor Takeo Hoshi of Stanford
University, one China-related and one Japan-related. His
China question addressed Mr. Ke’s remark that reform in
China has been talked about both during the Hu Jintao
administration and now in the Xi Jinping administration.
He asked the panelists whether, based on the lack of
progress with reform, they believe the government is
actually serious about reform.

Professor Milhaupt gave closing remarks for the conference,
stating that the panels and roundtable had covered a huge
range of topics. He said he was struck by the different
mechanisms, motivations, and constraints at work in
government intervention, and how this mixture has
changed over time in the three countries discussed. The
United States used to be more interventionist and now is
more crisis-driven in its approach to government
involvement in the economy. Japan shifted from oldfashioned industrial policy to a more market-conforming
model, though perhaps it continues to vacillate between
those two poles. Over the last thirty years, China has
changed its mode of intervention from central planning to
engagement in the economy through state-owned
enterprises and investment vehicles; hopefully, it will
continue to withdraw from direct market interventions.

His Japan-related question referred to Professor Ogawa’s
point regarding the lack of private risk capital. He wondered
whether a reason why the private sector is reluctant to
provide risk capital is due to the potential for government
intervention. In other words, does the government
willingness to supply risk capital draw down the demand
for the private sector to supply it.
Regarding the China-related question, Mr. Ke asserted that
Japan acts in a more socialist way than China.The difference
between Japan and China is transparency; in China, there
is an enormous lack of transparency while Japan is very
transparent.With regard to reform,strengthening transparency
is politically very difficult for the Xi Jinping administration.
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